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This paper shows that politicians’ pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk 
exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that 
are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly 
financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance incentive the riskier the respective 
local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds primarily for local banks which are under a 
certain degree of control of local politicians and it has increased with the release of recent 
stimulus packages requiring local co-financing. 
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Politicians’ Promotion Incentives and Bank Risk Exposure in China 
 
1.  Introduction 
Government involvement in the banking sector is often met with skepticism. Scholars, 
such as Krueger (1974) or Shleifer et al. (1994), argue that politicians’ personal objectives 
distort the bank’s performance and lead to a misallocation of resources. Distortions arise from 
either misusing banks for politicians’ direct private benefit or indirectly supporting their 
career by means of political credit cycles (Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Micco et al., 2007). 
Typically, empirical studies identify politically driven distortions by comparing banks under 
political influence to banks that are run fully privately (Iannotta et al., 2012; Pereira and 
Maia-Filho, 2013). To some extent, this approach is always infected by non-political factors 
which also give rise to different behavior between bank types. For example, banks under 
public supervision often pursue different objectives targets than private banks and thus the 
two groups of banks may be not fully comparable to each other. 
Therefore, in our research on the impact of government involvement we follow an 
approach which is not based on comparing bank types. Instead we measure scope and scale of 
politicians’ incentives which is meaningful because the promotion system is fully centralized 
within China (Jin et al., 2005). Promotion mainly follows the achievements realized by local 
politicians that are largely defined by quantifiable measures (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). 
Whether such a promotion policy is adequate in various respects has been questioned in 
Chinese studies, especially in the attempt of shedding light on negative effects on the 
performance of banks in China (e.g., Qian et al., 2011). These negative effects arise from the 
strong incentives set for politicians to stimulate economic growth in combination with their 
limited liability. 
The main economic problem of these distorted incentives is not only the quality of 
lending but also the sheer amount of local debt. The rapidly rising debt of Chinese local 
governments, i.e. all levels of government below the central government, has led to major 
concerns.1 Owing to inadequate repayment capabilities, some local governments are left with 
1 In fact, the Chinese political hierarchy has five administrative layers: the central government, provinces, 
prefectures, counties and townships (Li and Zhou, 2005; Jin et al., 2005; Xu, 2011). Local governments 
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only two: either repaying old debts by raising new ones or not paying off debts that are 
overdue. The latter has been recently observed in some localities.2 Worse still, according to 
an audit report by the National Audit Office in 2013, 78.1% of the debt comes from banks,3 
showing that local governments are closely related to the banking system. It seems that no 
one is able to understand in depth the risk of Chinese banks without considering the role of 
local governments. 
Our approach rests on detailed data about balance sheet information of banks in China, 
allowing us to calculate indicators of risk taking, including necessary control variables. 
Banks’ risk taking is explained by a set of standard variables which are complemented by our 
variable of interest, i.e. an index of political pressure to perform. Based on data for the period 
2005 to 2012 we find that such a pressure index explains risk taking of banks in the respective 
region. The result also holds in IV-regressions. This finding provides a novel identification of 
political influence on the banking system, which is of interest for researchers but also adds to 
the applied policy discussion in China. 
This main result is corroborated by two more findings: first, the impact from political 
pressure is only relevant for banks that operate regionally, possibly because they cannot avoid 
the pressure. Second, we find that the relation between political pressure and risk taking has 
become stronger and more significant after the financial crisis. The crisis brought large-scale 
macroeconomic stimuli to the Chinese economy which required the local politicians to 
co-finance certain projects. 
Moreover, we reveal the channels by which risk taking takes place, i.e. by reducing 
liquidity, increasing loan volume and reducing loan quality. Finally, further robustness checks 
regarding definition of variables and methods support our main findings. 
Our paper is close in spirit to the “political view” of government involvement in the 
banking system which emphasizes the inefficient outcomes resulting from politicians’ 
deliberate policy of maximizing their own personal objectives (Krueger, 1974; Shleifer and 
(subnational governments or lower-tier governments) refer to any layer from the last four administrative layers. In 
the empirical part of this paper, we mainly focus on local governments at provincial and prefecture level. The term 
“local politicians” refers to local government officials.  
2 Source: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.24 of 2013, http:/ 
/www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/3291665.html). 
3 Source: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.24 of 2013, http:/ 
/www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/3291665.html). 
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Vishny, 1994). As argued by Hainz and Hakenes (2012), a selfish politician often uses 
subsidized banks inefficiently from a welfare perspective. However, we focus on bank risk 
and not on overall bank performance (La Porta et al., 2002; Qian et al., 2011) or general bank 
lending behavior (Sapienza, 2004; Becker, 2007).4 Moreover, we explicitly show the impact 
of politicians’ promotion incentives and thus specify more general political considerations 
which have long been claimed as the main cause of distorted allocation of financial resources 
(Imai, 2012; Gur, 2012). Then, this paper stresses the role of subnational government officials, 
i.e. local politicians, in bank risk exposure. Unlike the traditional “political view” which relies 
on the election system of federal states (Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Micco et al., 2007), we 
explore a more specific Chinese style risk-channeling mechanism.  
Different from the studies which emphasize the positive role of Chinese politicians’ 
promotion incentives in pushing forward economic development and reducing inequality 
between regions (Jin et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005), our paper highlight the visible cost 
brought about by this promotion policy, such as inefficient investment and financing model 
going along with increasing bank risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts 
about China’s political promotion system, followed by a detailed analysis of the risk 
channeling mechanisms. Section 3 describes our data, sample and econometric methodology. 
Section 4 presents results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 gives further results as well as 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Stylized Facts and Mechanism in China: Local Politicians and Bank Risk Exposure 
2.1 Institutional Background 
Different from other transitional and developing countries, both the high degree of 
political centralization and fiscal decentralization in China make political promotion an 
important incentive for yardstick competition among local government officials (Blanchard 
and Shleifer, 2000; Jin et al., 2005). The central government, under the tight control of the 
4 Different from Hakenes and Schnabel (2014) who focus on the bailout policy of government and Qian et al. 
(2015) who focus on the incentives of bank loan officers, our paper emphasizes the role of local politicians. As 
argued by Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), bailout expectation leads to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk 
taking if there is a risk-shifting problem. Qian et al. (2015) point out that higher incentives of loan officers to 
produce high-quality information after the reforms of Chinese banks between 2002 and 2003 can help forecast 
future loan performance.  
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Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has the ultimate authority to decide on the appointment and 
removal of all the lower-tier government officials (i.e. local politicians) through a nested 
personnel-control network (Xu, 2011). Meanwhile, local governments are empowered to 
allocate economic resources in their regions (devolution of government authority) and are 
responsible for their economic performance. This centrally controlled decentralization not 
only links the political promotion of local officials to the economic development goals of the 
central government, but also enables local governments to independently make resource 
allocation arrangements in their own regions. Relative performance evaluations are 
widespread in China: provinces, cities, counties, townships and villages are continually 
ranked by their performance in growth, output and foreign investment (Maskin et al., 2000). 
Anyone who has been ranked towards the top in these evaluations or has been awarded the 
title of “advanced leader”, is more likely to be promoted as a “political bonus” (Xu, 2011). 
Though this economic performance-based promotion system has motivated local 
politicians to lend a “helping hand” in pushing forward local economic growth and reducing 
inequality between regions (Jin et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005), it also brings about many 
problems due to the fierce competition in public investment and financial resource grabbing 
of local governments. Large quantity-based performance indicators, such as GDP growth, 
building of infrastructure and foreign investment attraction, not only encourage “image 
projects”, “achievement projects” and “redundant projects”, but also place a large burden on 
local financing. Sichuan Province, one of the commonly-seen localities ambitious invest in 
infrastructure projects,5 has just announced its new plans of spending 4.3 trillion yuan only 
on the construction of three highways, five railroads and one airport over the next two years. 
The figure doubles Sichuan´s GDP of the entire year 2012 and is 10 times as high as its fiscal 
revenue during the same period.6 How can local governments raise all the money they need 
for their ambitious investments? Ever since 1994, Chinese local governments are not allowed 
to borrow money directly or run a budget deficit. Large funding gaps resulting from yardstick 
competition of local government officials stimulate the innovation of less-regulated and 
5 More description about fierce competition of local governments in public investment and financial resource 
grabbing can be seen in Li and Zhou (2005) etc.  
6 Source: China’s Local Government Debt Crisis: Though Heavily Leveraged and Linked to Shadow Banks, 
Provincial Infrastructure Spending Will Come Just Short of A Hard Landing (International Business Times, 2013). 
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riskier debt-financing vehicles. Table B1 in Appendix B gives a time table of major events 
related to Chinese local debts since 2008. 
Financing platforms, one of the vehicles which have evolved in China, provide local 
governments with a corporate structure7 to borrow from the market (85% are bank loans) and 
to quickly develop infrastructure. They are treated as municipal corporations under the 
Company Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). However, the law does not clarify 
the relationship between financing platforms and the local government, including the limits of 
the financial liability of the local governments. The platforms act as financing units, public 
sector investor, land development agent and project sponsor (or owner). An estimated 70% of 
financing platforms are under the direct control of the municipal governments, while in other 
cases they may report to the department of construction, the local asset management 
department, or the local department of reform and development (World Bank, 2009). Table 1 
describes the debt raising units of local governments by the end of 2012. Financing platform 
companies account for 45.7% of the total audited local government debts, underpinning its 
significant role in bank risk channeling. 
2.2 Mechanisms and Hypotheses 
Though the concept of a “promotion-motivated competition model” and its impact on 
local public investment and economic growth have gained much academic consensus 
nowadays in China, it is still only a few researchers who consider the impact this model may 
have on the stability of China’s financial system. Researchers like Qian et al. (2011) or Li and 
Qian (2012) pay attention to the credit effect of this “promotion-motivated competition 
model”. Their work shows that the promotion of local politicians has a significant effect on 
the quantity of credit by local commercial banks. Higher promotion incentive is usually 
associated with more credit of medium and long term (Qian et al., 2011). However, the risk of 
banks, in the process of financial resource grabbing, has been under-researched until now. As 
shown in Table 1, almost 80% of government debts come from bank loans, indicating that the 
usage of bank money and its financing models will inevitably impact bank risk. Figure 1 
7 This is a notation that appears in a World Bank’s report related to Chinese Financing Platforms (See World Bank, 
2009). The notation may well capture two aspects of financing platforms: First, from the view of the Company 
Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), these platforms embody corporation characteristics. Second, from 
the view of the relationship between these platforms and local governments, they act as agents of local 
governments, raising funds and sponsoring infrastructure construction etc. 
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summarizes several mechanisms how political promotion incentives may affect bank risk. 
First, since 92.1% of local government debts are spent on public infrastructure projects 
whose recovery of funds takes a fairly long time, banks are likely to suffer a higher credit and 
default risk due to the longer loan term and lower bank liquidity (see Campbell and Taksler, 
2003 for the relationship between term and risk). Potential payment risk confronted by banks 
is also likely to be driven up due to the accumulation of loans invested in low-yield 
infrastructure projects. According to an audit report announced by the National Audit Office 
of China in 2011, a total of 1,734 (i.e. 26.4%) platforms were loss-making companies by the 
end of 2010. Massive debts used for building expressways, universities of higher education 
and hospitals has put some localities under heavy pressure to repay debts because of the low 
fee collections.8 
Second, the quality of bank loans can deteriorate as a result of financing platforms 
experiencing severe problems such as “land finance” (dudi caizheng), bad asset quality, and 
imperfect guarantee mechanisms. The repayment of debts depends heavily on the revenue of 
land sales, which may account for more than half of the total promised debt repayment in 
some localities. However, with the implementation of a series of stringent real estate policies 
and a slowdown of the Chinese economy in recent years, land revenue can no longer meet the 
promised volume target as easily as before. Moreover, it is also evident that some financing 
platform companies strive to obtain debt funds by using fake or illegal quality-based 
mortgages or overestimate the values of quality-based mortgages.9 Finally, a reciprocal 
guarantee model of the platforms makes it more likely for a platform to be affected by 
contagion effects. 
Third, the shorter average tenure of local politicians caused by promotion competition and 
career mobility strengthens the tendency for local governments to over-issue debts, leading to 
an increase in bank risk. Frequent turnover of government officials encourages the prevalence 
of short-term opportunism (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Thus, if politicians can expect the 
current debt burden to be transferred to their successors after a successful political promotion, 
8 Source: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.35 of 2011, 
http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/2752208.html). 
9 Reference: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.35 of 2011, 
http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/2752208.html). 
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they will tend to be more careless about investing and debt-financing (Persson and Svensson, 
1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). 
Given the above discussed sources of bank risk, this paper hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 1. Promotion incentives of local politicians may affect bank risk, and an 
increase in promotion incentives will lead to an increase in bank risk. 
One may argue that the effect of promotion incentives on bank risk can differ among 
different banks. According to an official report, platforms of prefecture-level and county-level 
account for 70% of the total number of platforms in China10, implying that city commercial 
banks and rural cooperative financial institutions are more vulnerable to the crash of 
platforms. Besides, direct bank control or personnel appointment rights in some prefectures 
and counties facilitate yardstick competition. Some city commercial banks are even regarded 
as the “second finance level” of local governments (Qian et al., 2011). Thus, it is more likely 
for banks on prefecture-level and county-level to be affected by local politicians’ promotion 
incentives. We therefore also propose that: 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of promotion incentives on bank risk is more significant for city 
commercial banks and rural cooperative financial institutions. 
We consider the possibility that the effect of promotion incentives on bank risk may differ 
over time. To mitigate the shocks brought about by the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
Chinese central government announced the implementation of a 4 trillion yuan stimulus 
package aimed at the development of indemnificatory housing projects, rural construction, 
communication and transportation construction etc. The policy support for expanding 
infrastructure did not only intensify the fierce public investment competition among local 
governments, but also imposed a heavy financial burden on local governments as it was 
required that 70% of the funds needed by the package were to be reallocated from the budget 
of local governments. According to the Chinese Regional Financial Operation Report (2010)11 
released by the central bank, the total number of platform companies which played a 
significant role in grabbing financial resources from banks for local governments exceeded 
10 Source: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.35 of 2011, 
http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/2752208.html). 
11 Source: The Chinese Regional Financial Operation Report(2010, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/goutongjiaoliu/ 
524/2011/20110601212610189374552/20110601212610189374552_.html). 
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10,000 by the end of 2010, while there were only around 3,000 at the first half of 2008. This 
rapid increase may indicate a more significant relationship between promotion incentives and 
bank risk. Furthermore, many local politicians tend to be more enthusiastic about better 
economic indexes and ranking results during crises to prove their ability of dealing with crises. 
Therefore we expect that: 
Hypothesis 3. The effect of promotion incentives on bank risk is more significant after 
the global crisis of 2008. 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Data 
Since a balanced panel would reduce our sample considerably, we test the hypothesis 
using an unbalanced panel of 147 Chinese banks for the period 2005-2012. All the banks in 
the sample have observations of at least 4 years, so that we still cover nearly 80% of the total 
of Chinese banks with publicly-released data.12 Our empirical results are robust to including 
banks with less than 4-year observations or using the balanced panel extracted from the 
current sample.13 Accounting data on banks stem from the annual reports of each bank, and 
data on the macro-economy are all sourced from the “China City Statistical Yearbook”, the 
“China Statistical Yearbook” or the website of the People’s Bank of China. 
Regarding bank specialization, we distinguish four major kinds of Chinese banks in our 
sample, i.e. large commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks 
and rural cooperative financial institutions. As shown in Table 2, all the existing five large 
commercial banks (i.e. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, 
Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of Communications) and 12 joint-stock 
commercial banks (i.e. China Citic Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, China 
Guangfa Bank, Ping An Bank, China Merchants Bank etc.) in China are included in our data 
set. These two kinds of banks account for 11.6% of the total number of banks and they are 
referred to as national commercial banks. Local commercial banks, like city commercial 
banks (63.9% of the total number of banks), rural commercial banks and rural cooperative 
financial institutions (24.5% of the total number of banks), constitute the most important part 
12 The percentage is based on the number of banks established before 2010. 
13 We do not report full regression results in this part since there is a large number of regressions citation with 
qualitatively similar results. 
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of our sample. 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
3.2.1 Empirical Model 
Our first and main hypothesis is that promotion incentives of local politicians can affect 
bank risk taking, and an increase in promotion incentives will lead to an increase in bank risk. 
The basic empirical specification to test the hypothesis is given as follows, 
               , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 1 4 1 ,b t b t b t t t b tZ P X Y Mα α α α α µ− − − −= + + + + +          (1) 
where ,b tZ  is a measure of the risk of bank b for period t. , 1b tP −  are the promotion 
incentives of local politicians corresponding to bank b. , 1b tX −  is a matrix of bank-level 
control variables, 1tY −  represents macro-level control variables, 1tM −  controls for the 
impact of the concentration in the banking sector. ,b tµ  is the error term and 1α , 2α , 3α , 
4α are slope coefficients or vectors of coefficient estimates. According to Hypothesis 1, 
, 1b tP −  is the key variable in the regression, and we expect the corresponding coefficient 1α to 
be negative. The construction and measure of all variables is described in detail in Section 
3.2.3. 
It is possible that our results are affected by the endogeneity of political promotion: The 
risky behavior of banks may impact a series of macro-economic variables, leading to a change 
in the promotion incentive of local politicians.14 To alleviate this problem, all the explanatory 
variables are lagged by one period (see Marques et al., 2013). In addition to that procedure, an 
instrumental variable approach will also be introduced in the next section. 
3.2.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
We propose fiscal decentralization as an instrumental variable for the political promotion 
index. The argument runs that higher fiscal decentralization gives local politicians more rights 
to make resource allocation decisions in their own regions (Zhou, 2007), which more likely 
lead to better economic ranking and lower promotion pressure. At the same time, there is no 
obvious direct relation between the degree of fiscal decentralization and bank risk taking. 
14 In the variable construction part, we will show how promotion incentive is related to macro-economic variables 
under an economic performance-based promotion system. 
10 
 
                                                        
As a measure of fiscal decentralization, we primarily use the ratio of local government’s 
own revenue to its total expenditure (Akai and Sakata, 2002). Compared with two other 
commonly used proxies for fiscal decentralization, the share of local government’s spending 
in total government spending (Qiao et al., 2008) and the share of local government's overall 
revenue in total government revenue (Wang, 2013), our measure can well reflect how public 
spending at lower-level government is maintained on the basis of its own revenue (Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2002). Actually, our results still hold when we use the share of local government’s 
spending (revenue) in total government spending (revenue) as the instrumental variable for 
fiscal decentralization. 
To show the appropriateness of fiscal decentralization as an instrument of political 
promotion in an econometric sense, we also conduct two tests. First, we confirm that there is 
an econometric endogeneity problem by the Hausman specification test. The significant 
difference in the coefficients between Instrumental regression and the regression without an 
IV (with p-value 0.000) indicates that there exists an econometric endogenous variable in our 
basic regression, supporting the necessity for our instrumental variable approach. In the 
second test, we check if fiscal decentralization enters the first-stage regression significantly 
through the F-test of excluded instruments. A reported p-value of 0.000 shows us a significant 
correlation between fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive. Thus, in this case we do 
not need to be concerned about a weak instrument problem of the fiscal decentralization. 
From the view of both economic and econometric aspects, it seems therefore appropriate 
to use fiscal decentralization as an instrument variable for political promotion pressure. 
3.2.3 Construction of the Variables 
In this section we explain the construction of variables which we use in the above 
introduced regressions. The LHS variable is bank risk Z, the RHS variables are promotion 
incentives P, bank-level controls X, macro-level controls Y, bank concentration M and for 
later analyses (in Section 5.1) channel-specific variables B. 
(a) Bank risk variable ,b tZ : Existing literature has shown a variety of measures for risk, 
such as expected default frequency (Altunbas et al., 2010), risk asset ratio (Gropp et al., 2011) 
or, volatility of equity returns (Laeven and Levine, 2009), in order to capture different aspects 
11 
 
of bank risk. Because of the shortage of default and equity return data (Zhang and He, 2012), 
expected default frequency and volatility of equity returns are not appropriate measures to 
capture the risk of most banks especially when looking at the local banks in China. Besides, 
some banks don’t directly report risk asset volume or risk asset ratio. Thus, in this paper, we 
primarily use the z-score (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013; Distinguin et al., 2013), 
which equals the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio of each bank divided by the 
standard deviation of asset returns, to measure bank risk. As a broader measure of risk, it 
encompasses both credit risk and market risk (Marques et al., 2013), and it is also widely used 
in empirical research of the Chinese banking sector.15 A higher z-score indicates a less risky 
bank. We compute the standard deviation of asset returns using 4-year rolling windows 
(Distinguin et al., 2013) and take the natural logarithm of it because of the high skewness 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009). Alternative periods of rolling windows16 and risk measures will 
be applied for the robustness check. 
(b) Promotion incentives Pb,t: Since local politicians who are under higher pressure to 
climb the political career ladder tend to have more incentives to be ranked higher in the 
relative performance evaluation, we construct a ‘promotion pressure index’ to measure the 
promotion incentives of local politicians. Based on the method of Qian et al. (2011), we first 
calculate the promotion pressure index Pi,t for local politicians in each administrative region 
(denoted by i ), including 31 province-level regions17 and 283 prefecture-level cities in 
China.18 The promotion incentives Pb,t, for local commercial banks then correspond to the 
promotion pressure index of the regions where these banks operate in 19, for national 
commercial banks they correspond to the weighted average level of the promotion pressure 
index (weighted by the number of subsidiaries in each province).  
15 See the work of Xu and Chen (2012). 
16 See Beck et al. (2013), Distinguin et al. (2013) for a 3-year rolling window application and see Laeven and 
Levine (2009), Marques et al. (2013) for a 5-year rolling window application.  
17 Cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Tianjin are province-level regions. Moreover, we exclude 
Hongkong and Macao here since their political systems (they are allowed to adhere to the capitalist system) are 
different from the mainland’s system and they also have a high degree of autonomy in legislation and final 
jurisdiction etc. 
18 It is really a Chinese-specific index, since the appointment and removal of local politicians depend considerably 
on the relative performance of politicians. Section 3.1 can also help us to understand the reason why we construct 
the promotion index in the way we do. We differ from other researchers such as Qian et al. (2011) whose pressure 
score has only two values (better than the average level: 0; worse than the average level: 1), by dividing the values 
of each indicator into more intervals. Thus our index can better reflect the relative situations. 
19 Some city commercial banks such as Jiangsu Bank, Huishang Bank and Jilin Bank have been restructured to be 
provincial banks, thus correspond to the pressure index of related provinces. 
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The construction of promotion pressure index Pi,t is shown as follows. First of all, we 
need to choose evaluation indicators that are essential for politicians’ promotion. As Xu (2011) 
pointed out, multiple tasks of a regional government can be effectively converted into a single 
task, achieving a high GDP growth rate. Therefore, we include GDP growth rate as the most 
important evaluation indicator for our index construction. In addition, fiscal surplus and 
unemployment have also shown to be significant in the evaluation of local development in 
recent years (Qian et al., 2011), thus we will consider these two indicators as well. The 
promotion incentive variable in our paper in fact reflects the promotion pressure on local 
politicians exerted by GDP growth rate, fiscal surplus and employment rate.20 The next step 
is to construct pressure score Ski,t for region i  based on the relative performance in each 
indicator k within the same administrative level, as the appointment and removal of local 
politicians depend considerably on the relative performance of politicians from the same 
administrative level. For prefecture-level cities, a comparison will be made among the cities 
in the same province rather than among all cities all over the country, since province-level 
leaders have the power to hire and fire staff in prefecture-level cities (Xu, 2011). Yardstick 
competition is also more likely to happen among prefecture-level cities of the same province. 
Thus, one gets the promotion pressure index Pi,t by summarizing Ski,t according to indicator k, 
namely
, ,
k
i t i t
k
P S=∑ . More detailed information about the construction of promotion 
incentives Pb,t is provided in Appendix A.  
(c) Bank-level control variables , 1b tX − : Based on the work of Laeven and Levine (2009) 
and Altunbas et al. (2010), we include bank size, ownership structure and capital to asset ratio 
as bank-specific control variables. Bank size is measured as the log of banks’ total assets. The 
ownership structure is measured by two dummy variables which take the value of one or zero 
respectively if the bank is state-owned or state-legal-person owned. Capital to asset ratio is 
the inverse of the leverage of banks. Theory suggests that large and well-capitalized banks are 
better placed to buffer their lending activity against shocks affecting the availability of 
external finance (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2010). However, as Boyd 
20 We define fiscal surplus here as the fiscal revenue minus the fiscal expenditure divided by GDP.  More 
economic performance indicators such as FDI, transportation and road construction are considered in the 
robustness check.   
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and Runkle (1993) and Cukierman (2011) pointed out, “too big to fail” perceptions may 
encourage large banks to take more risks. Higher capital may also induce higher bank risk as 
a result of less monitoring efforts (Dell’ Ariccia et al., 2010). Thus, there is no consistent 
relationship between bank size (or capital to asset ratio) and bank risk. We also include banks’ 
ownership structure to capture the impact of explicit government support on bank risk (De 
Nicoló and Loukoianova, 2012). The charter value hypothesis indicates that state-owned 
banks take fewer risks to protect future rents (Keeley, 1990), while the market discipline 
hypothesis supports the view that state-owned banks may be more risk-taking since 
government support decreases the incentive of outside investors to monitor bank risk-taking 
(Marques et al., 2013). 
(d) Macro-level control variables 1tY − : Following Altunbas et al. (2010) or Marques et al. 
(2013), we include a series of macro-level control variables, such as GDP growth rate, 
aggregate inflation, housing price growth rate and fiscal surplus to GDP ratio. According to 
theory, the impact of these variables on bank risk may vary. On the one hand, better 
macroeconomic conditions can increase banks’ risk taking by causing a change of their risk 
perceptions (López et al., 2011). When GDP growth rate is higher, banks become more 
optimistic and tolerant to risks, which makes it more likely for them to soften lending 
standards (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011), or allocate riskier assets in their portfolios (Delis 
and Kouretas, 2011).21 Similarly, higher inflation (or housing price) can also lead to higher 
bank risk through the distortion of banks’ risk preference.  
On the other hand, better macroeconomic conditions help to reduce the overall risk of 
banks by increasing the profit of projects in terms of expected net present value (Kashyap et 
al., 1993). A boost in inflation and housing prices will increase the collateral value and reduce 
overall credit risk (Altunbas et al., 2010). Fiscal surplus to GDP ratio is introduced here to 
reflect the implicit guarantee of governments.22 Just like in the case of explicit support of 
governments, both the charter value hypothesis and the market discipline hypothesis show an 
21 This positive relationship has got much attention especially after the crisis of 2008 as more and more scholars 
try to explore the impact of the change of risk perception and tolerance on bank’s risk-taking. 
22 See “The Third Report Related to the Development of Chinese Shadow Banking---A Research on Urban 
Development Investment Bonds” by Mingdong Liu (2013) from the Institute of World Economics and Politics 
Chinese Academy of Social Science. 
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uncertain influence of fiscal surplus to GDP ratio on bank risk. As monetary policy is also 
identified to be an important determinant of bank risk in China (Zhang and He, 2012),23 we 
include the deposit reserve rate which reflects well the stance of Chinese monetary policy, 
capturing the risk taking channel of monetary policy. A negative relationship between deposit 
reserve rate and bank risk is predicted here. To distinguish between national commercial 
banks and local commercial banks, we control for national macro-level variables and local 
macro-level variables respectively. To be noted, though GDP growth rate and fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio are also used for the construction of promotion index Pb,t, there is no relevant high 
multicollinearity problem between promotion index and any one of these two macro-level 
control variables as low correlation coefficients are evident.24 
(e) Concentration of banking sector 1tM − : We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which 
is the sum of squared market shares according to bank loans, to measure market concentration 
of the banking sector. Again, the impact of market concentration on bank risk is ambiguous. 
Some argue that increasing bank charter values arising from increased market power create 
incentives for bank managers to act prudently, thereby contributing to lower bank risk (Boot 
and Greenbaum, 1993; Schaeck et al., 2009; Jiménez et al., 2013). While others such as Boyd 
and De Nicoló (2005) diverge from this “concentration-stability” view and stress a positive 
relationship between market concentration and bank risk. They argue that increased market 
power and higher loan rates may intensify firm’s inclination towards riskier investments and 
thus makes it more likely for banks to experience loan defaults. 
(f) Channel-specific variables ,b tB : We have four channels in the paper to be tested, i.e. 
“profitability channel”,“liquidity channel”, “volume channel” and “quality channel”. We 
basically use return on asset (ROA) as a measure of bank profitability, since ROA can capture 
the risk related to higher leverage when compared with ROE and it has been regarded as the 
key ratio for the evaluation of bank profitability (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Besides, as net 
interest income constitutes the most important part of Chinese banks, we also proxy bank 
23 See the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy (Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Borio and Zhu, 2012). It can be 
defined as the impact of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance and hence on the degree 
of risk in the portfolios, on the pricing of assets, and on the price and non-price terms of the extension of funding 
(Borio and Zhu, 2012). 
24 The correlation coefficients between promotion index and GDP growth rate and fiscal surplus to GDP ratio are 
respectively -0.12 and -0.39.  
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profitability using an alternative measure: net interest margin. To measure bank liquidity, we 
use a liquidity ratio which is defined as liquid assets over short-term liabilities to identify the 
role of bank liquidity in linking promotion and bank risk. Medium and long term loan ratios 
will also be applied to capture changes in the term structure of bank loans in this process. To 
measure volume of loans, like Qian et al. (2011), we use the loan to deposit ratio and the 
growth rate of loans to explore the impact of loan volume in the mechanism. 
Non-performance loan ratio and loan concentration ratio, which is measured by the loan 
proportion of the largest individual customer, are proxies of loan quality in the paper. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of all the regression variables, based on annual data for 
the periods 2005-2012. For two key variables, bank risk and promotion, the averages are 3.38 
and 3.59 respectively. The promotion index shows a higher variation (around 1.77) than bank 
risk (around 0.80). To identify whether promotion incentive is one of the significant 
determinants of bank risk, we still need to go further. Since most Chinese local commercial 
banks report indicators such as net interest margin, liquidity etc. only after 2006 or 2007, the 
number of observations for channel-specific variables is lower than for others indicators. 
Especially the long-term loan ratio has only 294 observations, thus it is important to pay 
attention to the possible bias related to the lack of observations. Loans still constitute the most 
important part of bank assets in China, with an average loan to deposit ratio of 63.2% and an 
annual growth rate of 25.3%. The high average proportion of outstanding loans of the largest 
single borrower (23.5%, greater than the regulatory standard 10%) indicates a high loan 
concentration in the Chinese banking sector. State ownership or state-legal-person ownership 
are the two most common bank ownership structures accounting for 39% and 26%, 
respectively. Moreover, the table also shows ample variation in most channel-specific 
variables and bank-specific control variables. For example, the minimum liquidity ratio of the 
sample is only 9.7%, less than half the regulatory standard (25%), while the maximum 
liquidity ratio reaches 129.4%. The great variation may be an indication of relatively high 
volatility or heterogeneity of the Chinese banking sector during this period. For 
macro-specific control variables, both GDP and housing prices have an average annual 
growth rate of nearly 13%. In these years we observed a negative value for the average fiscal 
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surplus to GDP ratio of -4.0%.  
4. Empirical Results and Analysis: The Effect of Political Promotion on Bank Risk 
The regression results of our basic specification using both national and local commercial 
data are presented in Table 4. Columns (1)-(5) report fixed-effect estimation results of the 
one-period lagged method after controlling for a series of variables, such as industry-specific, 
bank-specific and macro-specific variables.25 Column (6) reports regression results using 
fiscal decentralization as the instrumental variable for political promotion. As shown in this 
table, a higher promotion incentive significantly increases bank risk, and the result is robust to 
all variations across regressions. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of the IV-approach is 
even larger in absolute value terms than that of the one-period lagged approach: An increase 
in the promotion index by 1 leads to a decrease in the z-score by 0.072 percent, compared to 
0.050 percent in the one-period lagged method. 
The remaining coefficients of control variables in Table 4 are largely consistent with our 
expectations. Greater market concentration is associated with higher bank risk, indicating that 
higher market power and loan rates resulting from higher concentration may intensify a firm’s 
inclination for riskier investments and thus lead to higher bank risk. Larger and 
well-capitalized banks show lower risk, which may indicate better risk management by these 
banks. State owned banks take less risk than banks with other ownership structures, showing 
that the charter value effect dominates the market discipline effect for the state owned banks. 
GDP growth rate is positively related to bank risk, indicating that banks tend to soften lending 
standards or allocate riskier assets in portfolios due to the distortion of their risk preference in 
better macroeconomic conditions.26 Higher inflation is associated with an increased bank risk, 
which may be due to a change of their risk perception and tolerance as well. The significantly 
positive coefficient on the deposit reserve rate shows the existence of a risk taking channel of 
monetary policy in China. 
As the effect of political promotion on bank risk may vary with bank types and time, we 
extend our analysis by testing the differences related to bank types and time. Table 5 gives 
25 Since banking sector concentration is highly correlated with deposit reserve rate, thus we haven’t included these 
two variables in the same regression. 
26 This result is also consistent with the research of Xu and Chen (2012) and Zhang and He (2012), who focus on 
Chinese banks’ risk.  
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regression results using the instrumental variable approach while Tables B2-B5 in Appendix 
B give results using the one-period lagged approach. For national banks (Column 1), no 
significantly negative relationship is found between promotion incentive and bank risk, while 
for local banks (Column 2), higher promotion incentive leads to more bank risk. This result is 
robust to different estimation approaches and the change of control variables. The difference 
may be due to the fact that larger number of platforms and closer government-bank 
relationships make it more likely for banks at  prefecture-level and county-level (local banks) 
to be affected by local politicians’ (own) promotion incentives. Column 3 and 4 shows how 
the relationship between promotion incentive and bank risk differs for two different periods: 
2005-2007 and 2008-2012.27 As shown in the table, no significant relationship is found 
before the crisis of 2008, while the relationship has become much more pronounced after the 
crisis unfolded. An impressive surge in the size of government financing vehicles and the 
enthusiasm of local politicians for better economic indexes and ranking results to prove their 
ability of dealing with crises may account for the significantly positive effect of promotion on 
bank risk. 
Table 5 and Tables B2-B5 also allow us to distinguish between the differences of the 
effects of other control variables on bank risk for different bank types or periods. Banking 
sector concentration displays a negative impact on the risk of local banks while that impact on 
the risk of national banks is positive28. This indicates that the charter value channel of sector 
concentration dominates for Chinese local banks. Capital to asset ratio display a significant 
and robust negative effect only on the risk of local banks, which indicates that local banks 
with higher capital to asset ratio are placed better to buffer their lending activity against 
shocks. The reasons for the above differences between national and local banks are historical. 
In China, national banks, especially large commercial banks, have been under the parachute 
of the central government ever since the day they were established. A lot of problems such as 
soft budget constraint, lack of appropriate incentive mechanisms for loan monitoring lead to 
27 The development of financing platforms shows a big difference between the years 2005-2007 and 2008-2012. 
But China did not experience a significant difference in economic development due to the global financial crises. 
28 For regression (1) in Table B3, the coefficient of banking sector concentration is negative. This may be due to 
the serious endogeneity problem in this regression since the number of explanatory variables is limited. The 
coefficients of banking sector concentration in regression (2) and (4) may be more convincing. Besides, when we 
use a different model for local banks (see Table 9), positive coefficients can also be found, which further supports a 
negative relationship between banking sector concentration and bank risk. 
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the differences in risk taking and management behavior between national and local banks.  
Besides the differences for different bank types, we also find remarkable changes over 
time. Banking sector concentration shows a highly significant and robust positive effect after 
the crisis, which shows that firm’s inclination for riskier investments increase after the crisis 
and makes it more likely for banks to go bankrupt as banks’ market power increases. The 
growth rate of housing prices is positively related to bank risk before the crisis while this 
relationship turns to  negative after the crisis, indicating that a higher housing price growth 
rate tends to lead to an increase in the collateral value and thus reduces overall credit risk after 
the crisis. The impact of GDP growth rate on bank risk also differs in the periods 2005-2007 
and 2008-2012. For the latter period, higher GDP growth rate is associated with higher bank 
risk, which may be attributed to the softening of bank lending standards and increasingly 
holding riskier assets when banks became optimistic and more tolerant to risks. Before the 
2008 crisis, however, the impact of the GDP growth rate is insignificant and even positive. 
5. Further Results and Robustness Check 
5.1 Testing Mechanisms by which Bank Risk Is Affected 
Thus far, our empirical results have confirmed the prediction of Hypothesis 1, 2, 3: 
Stronger promotion incentives of local politicians may lead to more bank risk, and this 
relationship is especially pronounced for local banks and the years after the crisis of 2008. 
However, we are still mute about the mechanisms through which political promotion affects 
banks’ risk. 
According to the analysis of Hypothesis 1, stronger promotion incentives of local 
politicians may increase bank risk through the following four channels. The first one is the 
“liquidity channel”. As shown in Figure 1, 92.1% of local government debts are spent on 
public infrastructure projects which indicates that most of the funds borrowed from banks are 
long-term loans. Besides, the fairly long fund recovery time for these infrastructure projects 
and problems with debt overdue may also make it more likely for banks to suffer from lower 
liquidity and thus higher bank risk when promotion incentives are higher. The second channel 
is the “profitability channel”. Similar to the first channel, this channel is also closely 
associated with local governments’ decision how borrowed funds are invested. Low and even 
negative profits of financing platforms result from low fee collections of infrastructure 
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projects; the frequent occurrence of so called “white elephant projects” in China may exert a 
negative effect on banks’ profitability and bank risks. The third channel is related to the bank 
risk brought about by increasing loan volumes under higher promotion incentives, which can 
be named as the “volume channel”. Besides the infrastructure construction boom, the shorter 
average tenure of local politicians caused by higher political promotion incentives is another 
factor that leads to the increase in loan volume. Politicians expect that the debt burden from 
today will be transferred to their successors after a successful political promotion, 
strengthening the tendency for local governments to over-issue debts. The fourth channel is 
the “quality channel”. Higher political promotion incentives may stimulate the fast 
development of financing platforms. Serious problems such as “land finance”, bad asset 
quality, poor debt solvency and imperfect withdrawal mechanism of these unsoundly 
regulated vehicles are all posing threats to the quality of bank loans, which may result in 
higher bank risk. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4. Stronger promotion incentives of local politicians may increase bank risk 
through the “liquidity channel”, the “profitability channel”, the “volume channel” the and 
“quality channel”. 
To identify the significant channel through which promotion incentives of local politicians 
affect banks’ risk, we carry out a two-step analysis according to Mackinnon (2008)’s 
method:29 In the first step, we analyze how promotion incentives impact variables like banks’ 
profitability and lending characteristics and how bank risk responds to these variables by 
estimating the following models:  
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 1 1 ,b t b t b t t t t b tB P X Y Mb b b b b ε− − − −= + + + + +          (2) 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 1 4 1 ,b t b t b t t t b tZ B X Y Mγ γ γ γ γ ϑ− − − −= + + + + +          (3) 
where ,b tB represents channel-specific variables, including bank profitability, bank liquidity, 
volume of loans, and quality of loans, for bank b in period t. ,b tε  and ,b tϑ are the error 
terms.  
In the second step, we regress the bank risk variable on both the promotion variable ,b tP  
29 See the book called “Introduction to Statistical Mediation Analysis” (Mackinnon, 2008) for more information 
related to this method.  
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and the channel-specific variable ,b tB , i.e. 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 1 5 1 ,b t b t b t b t t t b tZ P B X Y Mδ δ δ δ δ δ ϑ− − − − −= + + + + + +     (4) 
A certain channel exists when the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) Both 1b  and 
1γ  are significant; (b) the inclusion of ,b tB  in the basic regression (1) will decrease the 
significance of the impact of local promotion on bank risk, namely 1δ  is less significant 
than 1α . 
Since different measures may reflect different aspects of a certain mediator variable, we 
use two alternative measures to proxy each channel-specific variable. Table 6-7 show us how 
promotion incentives impact channel-specific variables like banks’ profitability etc., and how 
bank risk responds to the channel-specific variables.30 We find that a higher promotion 
incentive is significantly related to a lower liquidity ratio,31 which provides the evidence that 
political promotion can affect banks’ liquidity in the process of financial resource grabbing. 
Profitability doesn’t depend on promotion incentives, as reflected in the insignificant 
coefficients for both return on asset and net interest margin.32 This may be due to the 
development of the Chinese shadow banking system and the increasing diversification of 
bank income in recent years33 so that the low profitability of infrastructure projects can 
hardly exert significant impact on the overall profitability of banks.34 Growth rate of loans 
and loan to deposit ratio depend positively on promotion incentives, showing that larger loan 
volume occurs under a higher promotion incentive. Non-performance loan ratios and loan 
concentration ratios also increase with higher promotion incentive, implying a negative 
relationship between political promotion and loan quality. 
for the effect of channel-specific variables on bank risk, the liquidity ratio is negatively 
30 Since the impact of promotion incentive on bank risk is not significant for national commercial banks, we only 
use the sample of local commercial banks in this section to identify the mechanism.  
31 Since we only have 294 observations of medium and long term loan ratios, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the insignificant relationship between this ratio and bank risk may be distorted. 
32 The sign of these two measures are totally different. One probable reason is that return on asset also considers 
non-interest income.  
33 See the report by Mingkang Liu, the former chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission in Lujiazui 
Forum of 2011(http://finance.qq.com/a/20110520/002070.htm). 
34 One may argue that it may take more time until profitability deteriorates. To make sure that this is the reason, 
we use a 2-5 year lagged promotion index as an explanatory variable of banks’ profitability, showing that the 
coefficients are still insignificant. Thus, if this argument holds, then it will take more time for political promotion 
to have an impact on banks’ profitability  
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related to bank risk, which is consistent with the findings in literature related to the 
determinants of bank risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Marques, 2013). Higher return on asset 
is associated with higher bank risk, consistent with the work of Xu and Chen (2012).35 Loan 
volume displays a positive relationship with bank risk, and this result is robust for different 
control variables and measures. Higher non-performing loan ratios and loan concentration 
ratios are also identified to be significant determinants of higher bank risk. Based on Table 
6-7, we find that profitability is not a significant variable linking promotion incentive and 
bank risk. Liquidity, 36 volume and quality of loans significantly depend on promotion 
incentives and have effects on bank risk as well. However, to confirm whether a certain 
channel exists, we need to go further by including the corresponding channel-specific variable 
in our basic regression and compare the significance of the coefficients on promotion 
incentives in Table 8 with those without channel-specific variables (Table 5 and Table B3). 
As shown in Table 8, except the growth rate of loans, the effects of promotion on bank risk 
becomes less significant or even insignificant after the inclusion of those channel-specific 
variables, showing that bank liquidity (measured by liquidity ratio), loan volume (measured 
by the loan to deposit ratio) and quality (measured by the non-performing loan ratio and loan 
concentration) are important variables linking promotion incentive and bank risk. It is to be 
noted that the volume channel works mainly through the change of loan to deposit ratio rather 
than the growth rate of loans.  
5.2 The Influence from a Change in Promotion Incentive on a Change of Bank Risk 
Different from our main empirical model, here we examine the relations of interest by 
comparing changes directly: Does a change in promotion incentives affect the change of bank 
risk? To answer this question, we further estimate the following difference model: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 1 4 1 ,b t b t b t t t b tZ P X Y Mα α α α α µ− − − −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +           (6) 
Where ,b tZ∆ is the change of z-score (in logarithm) for bank b. , 1b tP −∆  is the change of 
35 We must pay attention to the positive relationship between return on asset and bank risk, since return on asset 
itself is also an important variable for the construction of the z-score. Ceteris paribus, return on asset is positively 
related to the z-sore, indicating a negative relationship between return on asset and bank risk. Here, our regressions 
show that higher return on asset can be associated with higher bank risk, which could be explained by the 
following reason: From its construction it is clear that z-score equals the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio 
of each bank divided by the standard deviation of asset returns, which indicates that the z-score is not only related 
to the level of asset returns, but also related to the volatility of asset returns during the whole rolling windows.  
36 We cannot tell if long-term loan ratio plays a mediating role due to the limited amount of data. 
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promotion incentives corresponding to bank b. , 1b tX −∆ is the change of bank-level control 
variables, 1tY −∆  represents the change of macro-level control variables, 1tM −∆  controls for 
the change of banking sector’s concentration.37  
Since the impact of political promotion on bank risk is not of importance to national banks, 
we mainly use local bank data for the analysis in the remaining part of the paper. Table 9 
reports the estimation results for the above model. As shown in the table, an increase in the 
promotion index by 1 leads to a decrease in the relative change of z-score by 0.079 percent, 
indicating that a variation in the change of promotion incentives can cause the change of bank 
risk to move in the same direction. Our basic regression model presented in equation (1) may 
be affected by spurious regression problems which can hardly be detected by econometric 
tests such as unit root test etc. as our panel data only includes 8 years of observations. The 
significantly negative coefficient of , 1b tP −∆ , consistent with our basic regression, not only 
tells us how a change in promotion incentives affects the change of bank risk, but also 
supports our basic regression by showing a low probability for the basic regression to be 
affected by spurious regression. 
5.3 The Influence of Politicians’ Characteristics on the Relationship between 
Promotion Incentives and Bank Risk 
To further identify the effect of promotion incentives on bank risk, we also check how 
local politicians’ characteristics may affect the impact of promotion incentives on bank risk. 
Therefore, we incorporate several interaction terms between politicians’ characteristics and 
promotion incentives into our basic regression model (1): 
4
, 0 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 1 4 1 ,
1
*jb t b t b t b t b t t t b t
j
Z P C P X Y Mα α α α α µ− − − − − −
=
= + + + + + +∑        (7) 
Here , 1
j
b tC − ( 1, 2,3, 4j = ) represents the j th− characteristics of politicians (mayors) of the 
region where local bank b operates in. We consider four characteristics: (1) gender of 
politicians (=1, female; =0, male), (2) nationality of politicians (=1, member of the minority; 
=0, otherwise), (3) working experience of politicians (=1, has worked in an enterprise before; 
37 To give an intuitive economic explanation for all the coefficients in our regression, we take differences of the 
original data (without taking logarithms of some variables which are shown in Table 3.)  
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=0, otherwise), (4) tenure of politicians, namely how long has a politician been in a certain 
political position.38 We have not included the politicians’ age in the model, since high 
correlation (0.984) exists between the interaction term for age (i.e., age*promotion incentive 
index) and the promotion incentive index. 
Table 10 shows the estimation results for the above regression model. As shown in the 
table, politician characteristics such as gender and nationality have no significant effect on the 
relationship between promotion incentives and bank risk, indicating that the impact of 
political promotion incentive on bank risk doesn’t depend on the nationality of a politician or 
if a politician is male or female. Working in an enterprise before may help to decrease the 
bank risk which is caused by higher political promotion incentives, but the effect is not robust. 
Tenure has a significant and robust effect on the relationship between promotion incentives 
and bank risk: the influence of promotion incentives on bank risk is higher for politicians who 
have a shorter tenure, indicating that politicians who have been appointed to new positions 
may have more enthusiasm to show their competence in economic development, thus more 
likely to cause a higher bank risk.39 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
We perform four kinds of robustness tests:40 we modify (1) the bank risk measure, (2) the 
political promotion index, (3) the measure of fiscal decentralization, (4) the sample banks and 
(5) non-linear relationship between promotion index and bank risk. 
First, since the results in our paper may depend on the measurement of bank risk, we carry 
out our analysis again using alternative measures such as the NPL ratio (See Table B6) and 
the z-score of 3-year and 5-year rolling windows. Though expected default frequency and 
volatility of equity returns are also commonly found in the literature (Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Altunbas et al., 2010), they are inadequate for  capturing the risk of most banks, 
especially that of local banks in China because of the shortage of default and equity return 
data (Zhang and He, 2012). Our main results still hold when using the alternative measures. 
The second robustness check is related to our measure of the political promotion index. In 
38 Only a low correlation exists between any two of these interaction terms and between any of these interaction 
terms and the promotion incentive index.  
39 The results also hold when the main variables, as in Section 5.2, are taken in differences. 
40 We only report part of the regression results (Table B6-B9) since there is a large number of regressions here 
with qualitatively similar results.  
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the main analysis above, we only use the GDP growth rate, fiscal surplus and employment 
rate to construct the promotion index since the multiple tasks of a regional government can be 
effectively converted to a few related tasks. Here, we will show whether our results still hold 
when we include more indicators in the promotion index. As Li and Zhou (2005) pointed out, 
local government officials have also been playing an active role in building local 
infrastructure and attracting foreign investment. Thus, to explicitly reflect political promotion 
pressure in attracting foreign direct investment and building infrastructure, we add foreign 
direct investment to the GDP ratio, total freight traffic and per capita area of paved roads in 
the promotion index (See Table B7).41 The empirical results support our hypotheses. Besides, 
our results still hold when we standardize the economic performance-based promotion index 
or just use the GDP growth rate, the most important evaluation indicator in the index 
construction, to proxy promotion incentives. Lastly, we introduce dummy variables related to 
each value of promotion index42, instead of directly use this “linear” index. Results show that 
the dummy variables which indicate higher promotion index values are associated with higher 
bank risk (see Table B8). 
To exclude the possibility that our instrumental variable approach depends on the measure 
of fiscal decentralization, we use two other commonly used proxies, the share of local 
government’s spending in total government spending and the share of local government’s 
revenue in total government revenue (See Table B9 and B10). Our IV regression results are 
very robust in measuring fiscal decentralization. 
Furthermore, since some city commercial banks such as Beijing Bank, Nanjing Bank, 
Jiangsu Bank or Huishang Bank, have been restructured to be provincial banks or listed in the 
stock exchange, we eliminate these banks to exclude the possibility that they might drive our 
results. As the effect of political promotion on bank risk is insignificant before 2008, we test 
the mechanism again using only the sample during 2008-2012. Our main findings still hold 
after changing the sample. 
Lastly, we check if a non-linear regression model can better fit our data. We introduced 
41 The reason for us to use total freight traffic and per capita area of paved roads to reflect infrastructure building 
is that about 61.6% of government debts are spent on transportation and municipal constructions (National Audit 
Office, 2011) and almost every region reports these indicators in the sample years.  
42 For a promotion index which varies between [0,3n] where n is the number of indicators used for the 
construction of the index, we introduce 3n dummy variables. 
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the quadratic term of promotion index into the model. High correlation exists between this 
quadratic term and promotion index (0.96), making that a non-linear model with the quadratic 
term is faced with serious multicollinearity problem. Moreover, likelihood ratio test shows 
that introducing this quadratic form hasn’t help much in enhancing the fitness of our model.43  
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether political promotion incentives of local politicians provide an 
explanation for increasing bank risk in China today. Some stylized facts highlight the 
possibility that political promotion incentives of local government officials may affect bank 
risk in the process of financial resource grabbing. To this end, we construct an economic 
performance-based promotion index. Empirical results show that higher promotion incentives 
significantly increase bank risk and this relationship is even stronger, remarkably stronger for 
local commercial banks and the years after the crisis of 2008. These results hold in 
IV-regressions and are robust to a number of modifications, including the change of samples, 
the way we measure risk and promotion incentives. 
Moreover, we test the mechanisms through which political promotion mechanisms can 
significantly affect bank risk. Among the four possible mechanisms derived from the 
literature, we find no evidence for a profitability channel, which may be due to the increasing 
diversification of bank income in recent years (Loechel and Li, 2012). In contrast, bank 
liquidity, loan volume and loan quality all function as significant mediator variables: Higher 
political promotion tends to increase bank risk significantly by causing lower bank liquidity, 
larger volume and lower quality of bank loans. 
The results of our analysis have several potential implications for policymakers: First, 
controlling bank risk may no longer be limited to financial regulation organizations. Policy 
makers should also pay attention to root causes of an increased bank risks that are to be found 
in the area of politics. Second, diversifying the way local governments’ finance investments 
can also be one possible risk controlling method. Nowadays local governments which are not 
legally vested the right to debt raising fill large funding gaps in disguised forms through 
financing platforms, making it more likely to increase bank risks in the process of financial 
resource grabbing. Thus, suggesting other financing alternatives such as allowing local 
43 The p-value of likelihood ratio test is 0.27. 
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governments to issue debt securities may help control bank risk by introducing stricter market 
discipline into government financing. Third, paying close attention to the changes in some 
bank risk indicators, such as in the bank liquidity ratio, non-performing loan ratio and loan 
concentration ratio etc. can also help to control the risks caused by political promotion. 
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Table 1 Debt Raising Units and Debt Sources of Local Government Debts by the End of 2012 
    Debt raising units of local government debts  
  
Debt sources of local government debts  
 
Debt raising units Ratio  Debt sources     Ratio  
 
Financing platform companies   45.67%           Bank loans      78.07% 
 
Local governmental departments 
and institutions 
  25.37%           Bond issuing      12.06% 
 
Other units   28.96%           Other sources      9.87% 
 
Total 100%  Total      100% 
Note: Other units include institutions with government subsidies, public organs and government-affiliated 
institutions; Other sources includes Source: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of 
China (No.24 of 2013, http:/ /www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/3291665.html). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Distribution of the Sample 
Type of bank Number of banks in sample Percentage of the total number of banks (%) 
Large commercial banks 5 3.4 
Join-stock commercial banks 12 8.2 
City commercial banks 94 63.9 
Rural commercial banks and rural 
cooperative financial institutions 
36 24.5 
Total 147 100 
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Table 3   Summary Statistics 
          Variables N Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
 
Key 
variables 
z-score (in log) 1051 3.38 0.80 0.33 9.35 
Promotion 1051 3.59 1.77 0 9 
 
Channel 
–specific 
variables 
Liquidity ratio (in %) 832 52.50 16.32 9.71 129.42 
Medium and long term loan 
ratio (in %) 
294 24.41 17.05 0.23 71.01 
Return on asset (in %) 1023 0.96 0.49 0 2.98 
Net interest margin (in %) 743 2.66 2.43 0.38 21.91 
Growth rate of loans (in %) 1012 25.27 16.90 -65.03 142.96 
Loan to deposit ratio (in %) 888 63.21 9.76 20.62 91.48 
Non-performance loan ratio 
(in %) 
816 2.37 2.39 0 16.01 
Loan concentration (in %) 819 23.49 58.77 0.12 966.5 
       
Industry 
control 
Banking sector concentration  
(H-H index) 
1051 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.13 
       
Bank 
controls 
Bank size (in log) 1051 17.54 1.88 11.34 23.59 
State-ownership 1051 0.39 0.49 0 1 
State-legal-person ownership 1051 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Capital to asset ratio (in %) 1051 6.33 2.91 0.03 38.40 
       
Macro 
controls 
GDP growth rate (in %) 1051 12.85 2.77 -1.20 28.60 
Inflation (in %) 1051 3.10 2.19 -2.35 8.48 
Growth rate of housing price 
(in %) 
1051 12.92 8.33 -10.62 56.68 
Fiscal surplus to GDP ratio 
(in %) 
1051 -4.01 4.48 -38.90 4.86 
Deposit reserve rate (in %) 1051 15.13 4.28 7.50 20.83 
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Table 4  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: National and Local Banks 
Variables Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
with IV 
       
Promotion -0.049** 
(0.020) 
-0.039* 
(0.020) 
-0.048** 
(0.021) 
-0.056** 
(0.022) 
-0.050** 
(0.022) 
-0.072* 
(0.044) 
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
-11.366*** 
(1.620) 
-8.099*** 
(1.946) 
 
-7.043*** 
(2.130) 
---- 
 
---- 
       
Bank size 
 
0.062*** 
(0.020) 
 
0.049** 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
       
State-ownership 
 
0.227 
(0.147) 
 
0.229 
(0.147) 
0.289** 
(0.144) 
0.302** 
(0.146) 
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
 
0.15667 
(0.13429) 
 
0.16312 
(0.13421) 
0.205 
(0.133) 
0.212 
(0.133) 
       
Capital to asset ratio 
 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
       
GDP growth rate 
  
-2.205* 
(1.193) 
-2.805** 
(1.225) 
-1.855 
(1.232) 
-2.248 
(1.399) 
       
Inflation 
  
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.028** 
(0.013) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
  
-0.100 
(0.305) 
-0.110 
(0.308) 
-0.117 
(0.305) 
-0.109 
(0.305) 
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
  
1.559 
(1.095) 
-0.6768 
(1.1948) 
0.898 
(1.228) 
0.586 
(1.336) 
       
Deposit reserve rate 
  
0.049*** 
(0.007) 
---- 0.044*** 
(0.008) 
0.044*** 
(0.008) 
       
Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980 
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 ---- 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level. Since observations of deposit reserve rate and banking sector concentration is highly correlated, we 
have not included them in the same regression. 
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       Table 5  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: by Type and Period 
                    By type (IV regression)       By period(IV regression)  
Variables National bank Local bank 2005-2007 2008-2013  
     
Promotion 0.661 
(0.742) 
-0.111**  
(0.053)    
-0.092 
(0.205) 
-0.100*** 
(0.038)    
     
Banking sector 
concentration 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
     
Bank size -0.278 
(0.181) 
0.125    
(0.090) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
0.066**  
(0.029)   
     
State-ownership 0.166 
(0.617) 
0.072    
(0.196)    
0.715* 
(0.423) 
0.166    
(0.177)   
     
State-legal-person 
ownership 
0.619** 
(0.312) 
0.283    
(0.191)   
0.333 
(0.352) 
0.211    
(0.161) 
     
Capital to asset 
ratio 
-0.038 
(0.024) 
0.040*** 
(0.011)    
0.009 
(0.034) 
0.023**  
(0.012) 
     
GDP growth rate -10.171* 
(6.037) 
-5.890*** 
(1.666) 
2.774 
(5.343) 
-3.006**  
(1.519) 
     
Inflation -0.222*** 
(0.046) 
0.013    
(0.014) 
-0.040 
(0.050) 
-0.014    
(0.014)   
     
Growth rate of 
housing price 
-2.800** 
(1.239) 
0.176    
(0.323) 
-1.486** 
(0.695) 
0.860**  
(0.371) 
     
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
18.736 
(12.169) 
1.536    
(1.413) 
-3.586 
(8.677) 
-1.731    
(1.483)   
     
Deposit reserve 
rate 
0.149*** 
(0.030) 
0.002    
(0.015) 
-0.116 
(0.114) 
0.074*** 
(0.014)   
     
Observations 131 849 305 675 
R-squared ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Note: Regression results with one-period lagged approach can be seen in Table B2-B5 in Appendix B. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.10 level. 
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         Table 6   The Impact of Promotion on Channel-Specific Variables 
Channel-specific 
variables 
Indicators Regression 
(1) 
Regression  
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
       
Liquidity Liquidity ratio -1.190** 
(0.500) 
-1.061** 
(0.506) 
-1.088** 
(0.531) 
-1.076** 
(0.533) 
-1.131** 
(0.536) 
      
Long-term loan 
ratio 
0.599 
(0.441) 
0.478 
(0.448) 
0.448 
(0.474) 
0.373 
(0.485) 
0.462 
(0.485) 
       
Profitability Return on asset 0.001 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
      
Net interest 
margin 
0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.026 
(0.061) 
0.031 
(0.065) 
0.049 
(0.065) 
0.040 
(0.065) 
       
Volume Loan to deposit 
ratio 
0.867*** 
(0.277) 
0.579** 
(0.274) 
0.694** 
(0.284) 
0.508* 
(0.280) 
0.584** 
(0.284) 
      
Growth rate of 
loans 
1.765** 
(0.688) 
1.481** 
(0.672) 
1.615** 
(0.734) 
1.452** 
(0.715) 
1.469** 
(0.714) 
       
Quality Non-performing 
loan ratio 
0.181*** 
(0.066) 
0.179*** 
(0.066) 
0.148** 
(0.070) 
0.134** 
(0.068) 
0.136** 
(0.069) 
      
Loan 
concentration 
ratio 
4.113*** 
(1.314) 
3.743*** 
(1.301) 
3.559** 
(1.397) 
3.546*** 
(1.365) 
3.256** 
(1.378) 
Note: This part is based on the sample of local commercial banks only, since the impact of promotion incentive on 
bank risk is not significant for national banks (same for Table 7-9). We only present coefficients of the promotion 
variable. Control variables of regression (1)-(5) are the same as before. Standard errors are in parentheses. * 
Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.10 level. 
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Table 7   The Impact of Channel-Specific Variables on Bank Risk  
Channel-specific 
variables 
Indicators Regression 
 (1) 
Regression 
 (2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
       
Liquidity Liquidity ratio 4.113*** 
(1.314) 
3.743*** 
(1.301) 
3.559** 
(1.397) 
3.546*** 
(1.365) 
3.256** 
(1.378) 
      
Long-term loan 
ratio 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
       
Profitability Return on asset -0.192*** 
(0.054) 
-0.224*** 
(0.053) 
-0.273*** 
(0.055) 
-0.221*** 
(0.053) 
-0.270*** 
(0.054) 
      
Net interest 
margin 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.0004 
(0.011) 
-0.0002 
(0.011) 
       
Volume Loan to deposit 
ratio 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
      
Growth rate of 
loans 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
       
Quality Non-performing 
loan ratio 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
      
Loan 
concentration 
ratio 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
Note: We only present coefficients of mediator variables. Control variables of regression (1)-(5) are the same as 
before. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant 
at 0.10 level. 
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      Table 8   The Inclusion of Possible Channel-Specific Variables in the Basic Regression 
Variables 
 Liquidity 
ratio   
Growth rate 
of loans   
Loan to 
deposit ratio   
Non-perfor-
mance loan 
ratio 
  
Loan 
concentrati- 
on 
 
Regres-
sion (4) 
Regress- 
ion(5) 
Regress-
ion (4) 
Regress-
ion(5) 
Regress-
ion (4) 
Regress-
ion(5) 
Regress-
ion (4) 
Regress-
ion(5) 
Regress-
ion (4) 
Regress-
ion(5) 
           
Promotion -0.020 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.028) 
-0.072*** 
(0.024) 
-0.076*** 
(0.024) 
-0.045* 
(0.024) 
-0.045* 
(0.023) 
-0.061** 
(0.024) 
-0.056** 
(0.024) 
-0.042 
(0.028) 
-0.042 
(0.028) 
           
Banking 
sector 
concentration 
0.010 
(5.738) 
---- 
 
12.195*
** 
(3.379) 
---- 
 
-0.641 
(4.702) 
---- 
 
1.037 
(4.284) 
---- 
 
9.174* 
(5.161) 
---- 
 
           
Bank size 0.345**
* 
(0.105) 
0.142 
(0.118) 
0.365**
* 
(0.076) 
0.189** 
(0.092) 
0.299**
* 
(0.089) 
0.178* 
(0.099) 
0.278**
* 
(0.077) 
0.028 
(0.088) 
0.580**
* 
(0.108) 
0.400**
* 
(0.124) 
           
State-owners-
hip 
-0.235 
(0.277) 
-0.118 
(0.276) 
-0.030 
(0.198) 
0.059 
(0.199) 
-0.075 
(0.240) 
-0.015 
(0.238) 
0.028 
(0.195) 
0.124 
(0.192) 
-0.185 
(0.226) 
-0.087 
(0.225) 
           
State-legal-pe-
rson 
ownership 
0.390 
(0.246) 
0.433* 
(0.246) 
0.302 
(0.194) 
0.305 
(0.195) 
0.395* 
(0.211) 
0.422** 
(0.211) 
0.324* 
(0.192) 
0.321* 
(0.191) 
0.052 
(0.208) 
0.078 
(0.209) 
           
Capital to 
asset ratio 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.025 
(0.015) 
0.049**
* 
(0.011) 
0.040**
* 
(0.012) 
0.044**
* 
(0.011) 
0.041**
* 
(0.011) 
0.045**
* 
(0.012) 
0.034**
* 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
           
GDP growth 
rate 
-2.880* 
(1.554) 
-1.735 
(1.603) 
-6.470*
** 
(1.371) 
-5.613*
** 
(1.441) 
-3.301*
* 
(1.333) 
-2.598* 
(1.378) 
-3.320*
* 
(1.330) 
-1.331 
(1.389) 
-2.518* 
(1.481) 
-1.701 
(1.556) 
           
Inflation 0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
           
Growth rate of 
housing price 
-0.055 
(0.371) 
-0.059 
(0.369) 
0.024 
(0.322) 
0.064 
(0.326) 
0.019 
(0.314) 
0.016 
(0.313) 
0.124 
(0.318) 
0.142 
(0.315) 
-0.069 
(0.339) 
-0.088 
(0.340) 
           
Fiscal surplus 
to GDP ratio 
2.317 
(1.538) 
2.419 
(1.532) 
1.754 
(1.364) 
1.802 
(1.380) 
2.154 
(1.339) 
2.235* 
(1.337) 
1.488 
(1.286) 
1.881 
(1.278) 
1.369 
(2.086) 
1.406 
(2.097) 
           
Deposit 
reserve rate 
---- 0.041** 
(0.020) 
---- -0.007 
(0.015) 
---- 0.026 
(0.016) 
---- 0.055**
* 
(0.017) 
---- 0.005 
(0.020) 
           
Liquidity ratio 0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
        
           
Growth rate of 
loans 
  -0.003*
** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*
** 
(0.001) 
      
           
Loan to 
deposit ratio 
    -0.008*
* 
(0.004) 
-0.009*
* 
(0.004) 
    
           
Non-perform-
ance loan ratio  
      -0.034*
** 
(0.011) 
-0.021*
* 
(0.010) 
  
           
Loan 
concentration  
        -0.001*
* 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
Note: We only report regressions with the most control variables here, i.e. regression (4) and regression (5). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.10 level 
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Table 9   How A Change in Promotion Incentives Affects the Change of Bank Risk 
Variables Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
with IV 
       
Promotion -0.044** 
(0.020) 
-0.042** 
(0.020) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
-0.060*** 
(0.022) 
-0.062*** 
(0.022)    
-0.079**  
(0.036)    
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
19.762*** 
(5.824) 
19.088*** 
(5.806) 
 21.538*** 
(6.318) 
 ----               
                
----
       
Bank size  0.027 
(0.035) 
 0.027 
(0.038) 
0.033    
(0.038)    
0.029    
(0.039)      
       
State-ownership  0.538** 
(0.220) 
 0.537** 
(0.220) 
0.533**  
(0.223)    
0.538**  
(0.223)    
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
 0.325 
(0.211) 
 0.324 
(0.211) 
0.307    
(0.213)    
0.312    
(0.213)    
       
Capital to asset 
ratio 
 0.026** 
(0.013) 
 0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.027**  
(0.013)    
0.027**  
(0.013)   
       
GDP growth rate   -2.458** 
(1.192) 
-2.218* 
(1.145) 
-2.245*   
(1.203)    
-2.588*   
(1.330)   
       
Inflation   -0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.001    
(0.016)    
0.001    
(0.016)    
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
  -0.090 
(0.233) 
0.117 
(0.230) 
-0.053    
(0.232)    
-0.034    
(0.234)    
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
  -0.528 
(1.221) 
-0.773 
(1.282) 
-0.967    
(1.294)    
-1.088    
(1.310)   
       
Deposit reserve rate   0.006 
(0.027) 
---- 0.007    
(0.027)    
0.004    
(0.028)    
       
Observations 723 723 723 723 723 723 
R-squared 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.15 
Note: All the variables in this table are in difference forms. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 
0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.10 level 
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Table 10  Politicians’ Characteristics and the Relationship between Promotion Incentives 
and Bank Risk 
Variables Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
with IV 
       
Promotion*gender -0.028 
(0.035) 
-0.034 
(0.034) 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
-0.022 
(0.034) 
-0.025    
(0.034)    
-0.008    
(0.037)    
       
Promotion*nation- 
ality 
-0.091 
(0.130) 
-0.123 
(0.126) 
-0.101 
(0.128) 
-0.106 
(0.126) 
-0.117    
(0.127)    
-0.073    
(0.133)    
       
Promotion*working 
experience 
0.034* 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.020) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
0.028    
(0.020)    
0.043*   
(0.023)    
       
Promotion*tenure 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.010**  
(0.005)    
0.016**  
(0.007)    
       
Promotion -0.079** 
(0.032) 
-0.061* 
(0.031) 
-0.099*** 
(0.033) 
-0.092*** 
(0.032) 
-0.094*** 
(0.033)    
-0.182**  
(0.078)    
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
-7.293*** 
(1.995) 
11.516*** 
(3.680) 
 13.970*** 
(3.768) 
----                
                
---- 
       
Bank size  0.429*** 
(0.089) 
 0.417*** 
(0.091) 
0.233**  
(0.107)    
0.212*   
(0.109)    
       
State-ownership  -0.137 
(0.212) 
 -0.143 
(0.210) 
-0.041    
(0.211)    
-0.016    
(0.214)    
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
 0.202 
(0.215) 
 0.235 
(0.214) 
0.223    
(0.216)    
0.258    
(0.219)    
       
Capital to asset 
ratio 
 0.052*** 
(0.014) 
 0.049*** 
(0.014) 
0.040*** 
(0.014)    
0.039*** 
(0.014)    
       
GDP growth rate   -4.409** 
(1.721) 
-5.640*** 
(1.615) 
-4.874*** 
(1.718)    
-6.219*** 
(2.037)    
       
Inflation   0.007 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.026    
(0.016)    
0.031*   
(0.017)    
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
  0.381 
(0.381) 
0.171 
(0.376) 
0.250    
(0.380)    
0.252    
(0.383)    
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
  1.521 
(1.681) 
1.890 
(1.653) 
1.878    
(1.680)    
1.443    
(1.726)    
       
Deposit reserve rate   0.030*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
       
Observations 673 673 673 673 673 673 
R-squared 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.11 
Note: All the variables in this table are in difference forms. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 
0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.10 level 
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Figure 1 A Promotion-Motivated Competition Model and its Relationship with Bank Risk44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 Data source: The Audit Report by National Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.24 of 2013, 
http:/ /www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992150/n1992500/3291665.html). 
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Appendix A: Construction of the Promotion incentive Pb,t 
 
   We follow three steps to construct the Promotion incentive Pb,t: 
Step one: Construction of the pressure score ,
k
i tS  
1. Distinguish between two kinds of indicators. The first one are indicators satisfying the condition 
that a higher value implies better economic performance, and the second one are those 
satisfying the opposite condition that a higher value implies worse economic performance. Let 
,
k
i te ( 1, 2,...,k n= ) be the k-th evaluation indicator of local politicians’ performance in 
region i  and , {0,1,2,3}
k
i tS ∈ be the pressure score assigned to region i  based on the 
k-th evaluation indicator. 
2. For an indicator ,
k
i te  belonging to the first category, if the value of it falls into the 
interval min min[ , ( ) / 2)V V V+ , where minV  and V  are the minimum value and average value 
of the corresponding comparable sample respectively45, assign three to ,
k
i tS . If the value of ,
k
i te  
falls into the interval min[( ) / 2, )V V V+ , assign two to ,
k
i tS . If the value of ,
k
i te  falls into the 
interval max[ , ( ) / 2)V V V+  where maxV  is the maximum value of corresponding 
comparable sample, assign one to ,
k
i tS . If the value of ,
k
i te  falls into the 
interval max max[( ) / 2, ]V V V+ , assign zero to ,
k
i tS . 
46 Namely,  
 
, max max
, max
,
, min
, min min
0 , [( ) / 2, ]
1 , [ , ( ) / 2)
2 , [( ) / 2, )
3 , [ , ( ) / 2)
k
i t
k
i tk
i t k
i t
k
i t
if e V V V
if e V V V
S
if e V V V
if e V V V
 ∈ +
 ∈ +=  ∈ +
 ∈ +
; 
 
Similarly, we can assign a value among 0, 1, 2, 3 to ,
k
i tS  when ,
k
i te  belongs to the second 
category and a higher value of ,
k
i te  is associated with a higher value of ,
k
i tS . Namely, 
 
45 The indicator of a province will be compared with that of the average level of all the provinces. The indicator of 
a prefecture-level city will be compared with that of the average level of all the prefecture-level cities in the same 
province. 
46 All existing literature concerned with political promotion indexes only looks into whether the economic 
performance of a certain area is better than that of the average level. Actually, the difference between the economic 
performance of a certain area and the average level is also important for political promotion and this difference can 
be easily found in many economic reports. Thus, our promotion index also verifies this difference. 
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, min min
, min
,
, max
, max max
0 , [ , ( ) / 2]
1 , (( ) / 2, ]
2 , ( , ( ) / 2]
3 , (( ) / 2, ]
k
i t
k
i tk
i t k
i t
k
i t
if e V V V
if e V V V
S
if e V V V
if e V V V
 ∈ +
 ∈ +=  ∈ +
 ∈ +
 . 
 
Step two: Construction of the promotion pressure index ,i tP  from ,
k
i tS  
   Our promotion pressure index ,i tP  for local politicians in region i is constructed 
as , ,
1
n
k
i t i t
k
P S
=
=∑ , where , [0,3 ]i tP n∈ . A higher value of ,i tP indicates higher promotion pressure 
for local politicians in region i . 
 
Step three: Construction of the promotion incentive ,b tP  from ,i tP   
1. For local commercial banks, such as city commercial banks, rural commercial banks and 
rural cooperative financial institutions, the promotion incentives ,b tP  corresponds to the 
promotion pressure index of the regions where these banks belong to, namely: ,b tP = ,i tP   
2. For the national commercial banks, the promotion incentives ,b tP correspond to the 
weighted average level of the promotion pressure index, which is constructed as follows:  
 
31
,
, ,
1
j b
b t j t
j b
N
P P
N=
=∑                        (5) 
where j represents the j -th province, bN is the number of the subsidiaries of bank b all 
over the country, ,j bN is the number of the subsidiaries of bankb in province j . 
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Appendix B: More Tables 
 
Table B1  Table of Major Events Related to Chinese Local Government Debts since 2008 
Time  
                                       Events  
Main Contents  Background 
2011/03-2011/05 
 
National Audit Office of China (CNAO) organized 
a first-round audit of local government debts in 
compliance with the arrangement of the State 
Council. 
 
A local debt boom emerged 
with the implementation of 
stimulus packages which 
requires local co-financing. 
The potential problems of 
financing platforms which 
provides local governments 
with a corporate government 
structure to borrow from the 
market became thus more and 
more prominent. 
   
2011/7 
 
Bonds issued by platforms (See section 2.1 for 
more information about platforms) were confronted 
with default risks: “Dark July”. 
   
2011/10 
 
The central government allowed four subnational 
governments (Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong and 
Shenzhen) to issue bonds directly for the first time 
after an eighteen-year ban. 
   
2011/11 
. 
CNAO released the first-round audit results: As of 
the end of 2010, the balances of the local 
governmental debt stood at 10.717 trillion yuan 
   
2013/6 
 
Another two subnational government, i.e. 
Shandong and Jiangsu, were allowed to issue bonds 
directly. 
2013/08-2013/09 
 
The State Council, under Premier Keqiang Li, 
ordered a second-round urgent audit of local 
government debts. 
 
IMF warned the Chinese 
government of the financial 
risks brought about by local 
government debts. 
   
2013/10 
 
Institutions such as the Standard Chartered Bank, 
and government officials, like Huaicheng Xiang, 
the former Finance Minister, all estimate the 
balances of the local governmental debts to be 
above 20 trillion yuan. 
   
2013/11 
 
CNAO released the second-round audit results: Up 
to the end of June 2013, local governments at all 
levels throughout the country had borne the 
responsibility for the payment of 20.699 trillion 
yuan (in RMB) in  debts (The number doesn’t 
include implicit government debts). 
Reference: China Business Journal (http://www.cb.com.cn/economy/2013_1012/1016547.html); 2011 Measures 
for Experiment on Local Government Unauthorized Bond Issuance (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, 
Oct.17, 2011, effective Oct.17, 2011);2013 Measures for Experiment on Local Government Unauthorized Bond 
Issuance (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Jun.25, 2013, effective Jun.25, 2013); Audit Report by National 
Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China (No.35 of 2011 and No.32 of 2013, http://www.audit.gov.cn) 
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Table B2  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: National Banks  
 
Variables 
 One-period lagged approach  
 Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression(5) 
       
Promotion  0.181 
(0.149) 
0.148 
(0.148) 
0.154 
(0.140) 
0.088 
(0.142) 
0.090 
(0.135) 
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
 -28.652*** 
(3.449) 
-38.803*** 
(5.658) 
 -39.312*** 
(5.915) 
---- 
 
       
Bank size   -0.182 
(0.116) 
 -0.312** 
(0.136) 
-0.368*** 
(0.129) 
       
State-ownership   0.426 
(0.607) 
 -0.035 
(0.587) 
0.081 
(0.561) 
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
  0.640** 
(0.304) 
 0.504* 
(0.293) 
0.563** 
(0.280) 
       
Capital to asset 
ratio 
  -0.034 
(0.021) 
 -0.040** 
(0.020) 
-0.047** 
(0.019) 
       
GDP growth rate    -7.570 
(5.508) 
-13.008** 
(5.700) 
-11.316** 
(5.412) 
       
Inflation    -0.200*** 
(0.039) 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.237*** 
(0.039) 
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
   -2.601*** 
(0.944) 
-1.998** 
(0.993) 
-3.375*** 
(0.924) 
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
   14.013 
(11.593) 
-2.074 
(11.639) 
18.279 
(11.230) 
       
Deposit reserve 
rate 
   0.105*** 
(0.014) 
---- 0.164*** 
(0.021) 
       
Observations  131 131 131 131 131 
R-squared  0.40 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B3  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: Local Banks  
 
Variables 
 One-period lagged approach  
 Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression(5) 
       
Promotion  -0.048** 
(0.023) 
-0.039* 
(0.023) 
-0.073*** 
(0.024) 
-0.070*** 
(0.024) 
-0.073*** 
(0.024)    
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
 -7.480*** 
(1.741) 
6.974** 
(3.233) 
 10.105*** 
(3.293) 
 ----               
                
       
Bank size   0.306*** 
(0.073) 
 0.321*** 
(0.075) 
0.133    
(0.089)    
       
State-ownership   -0.020 
(0.197) 
 -0.038 
(0.194) 
0.060    
(0.195)    
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
  0.208 
(0.191) 
 0.262 
(0.189) 
0.274    
(0.190)    
       
Capital to asset 
ratio 
  0.052*** 
(0.011) 
 0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.039*** 
(0.011)    
       
GDP growth rate    -4.844*** 
(1.394) 
-6.108*** 
(1.340) 
-5.160*** 
(1.402)    
       
Inflation    -0.001 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.011    
(0.014)    
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
   0.236 
(0.321) 
0.100 
(0.318) 
0.145    
(0.320)    
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
   1.735 
(1.369) 
1.738 
(1.360) 
1.801    
(1.373)    
       
Deposit reserve 
rate 
   0.030*** 
(0.007) 
---- 0.002    
(0.015)    
       
Observations  849 849 849 849  849 
R-squared  0.03 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B4  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: 2005-2007 
 
Variables 
 One-period lagged approach  
 Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression(5) 
       
Promotion  -0.028 
(0.047) 
-0.056 
(0.048) 
-0.011 
(0.054) 
-0.020 
(0.055) 
-0.039 
(0.055) 
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
 3.159 
(3.713) 
2.288 
(3.895) 
 18.905** 
(8.305) 
---- 
 
       
Bank size   0.023 
(0.038) 
 0.060 
(0.052) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
       
State-ownership   0.751** 
(0.319) 
 0.615* 
(0.319) 
0.642** 
(0.324) 
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
  0.283 
(0.298) 
 0.257 
(0.294) 
0.282 
(0.297) 
       
Capital to asset 
ratio 
  0.018 
(0.032) 
 0.001 
(0.032) 
0.007 
(0.033) 
       
GDP growth rate    2.949 
(2.937) 
4.101 
(3.113) 
3.933 
(3.149) 
       
Inflation    -0.047 
(0.047) 
-0.173** 
(0.081) 
-0.045 
(0.047) 
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
   -1.619** 
(0.686) 
-1.107** 
(0.516) 
-1.496** 
(0.692) 
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
   1.442 
(4.624) 
-0.448 
(5.553) 
-1.809 
(5.612) 
       
Deposit reserve 
rate 
   -0.145 
(0.100) 
---- -0.129 
(0.103) 
       
Observations  305 305 305 305 305 
R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B5  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: 2008-2012 
 
Variables 
 One-period lagged approach  
 Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) Regression (4) Regression(5) 
       
Promotion  -0.062*** 
(0.022) 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
-0.075*** 
(0.025) 
-0.072*** 
(0.025) 
-0.073*** 
(0.025)    
       
Banking sector 
concentration 
 -39.739*** 
(4.088) 
-33.451*** 
(4.535) 
 -31.420*** 
(5.442) 
 ----               
                
       
Bank size   0.063*** 
(0.023) 
 0.062** 
(0.029) 
0.069**  
(0.029)    
       
State-ownership   0.153 
(0.177) 
 0.161 
(0.176) 
0.151    
(0.177)    
       
State-legal-person 
ownership 
  0.216 
(0.160) 
 0.208 
(0.160) 
0.201    
(0.160)    
       
Capital to asset 
ratio 
  0.025** 
(0.011) 
 0.023* 
(0.012) 
0.023**  
(0.012)    
       
GDP growth rate    -3.144** 
(1.398) 
-2.903** 
(1.392) 
-2.491*   
(1.419)    
       
Inflation    -0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
-0.017    
(0.014)    
       
Growth rate of 
housing price 
   0.798** 
(0.368) 
0.800** 
(0.367) 
0.813**  
(0.368)    
       
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
   0.759 
(1.161) 
-0.945 
(1.426) 
-1.307    
(1.415)    
       
Deposit reserve 
rate 
   0.096*** 
(0.012) 
---- 0.076*** 
(0.014)   
       
Observations  675 675 675 675 675 
R-squared  0.16 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B6  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: With NPL Ratio as Risk Measure 
Variables Whole sample 
 By type  By period 
 National bank   Local bank  2005-2007   2008-2012 
        
Promotion   0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.000    
(0.007)    
0.001** 
(0.001) 
 0.000    
(0.003)    
0.002** 
(0.001) 
        
Banking sector 
concentration 
---- 
 
  ----               
                
---- 
 
 ----              
                
 ----               
                
        
Bank size 0.001 
(0.001) 
 0.012*   
(0.006)    
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.001    
(0.002)    
-0.001 
(0.001) 
        
State-ownership 0.002 
(0.005) 
 -0.009    
(0.027)    
0.001 
(0.005) 
 -0.024    
(0.029)    
0.011** 
(0.004) 
        
State-legal-person 
ownership 
0.002 
(0.004) 
 0.000    
(0.014)    
-0.001 
(0.005) 
 -0.004    
(0.018)    
0.006* 
(0.004) 
        
Capital to asset 
ratio 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
 -0.001    
(0.001)    
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.002    
(0.001)    
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
        
GDP growth rate -0.199*** 
(0.044) 
 -0.001    
(0.265)    
-0.135*** 
(0.042) 
 -0.074    
(0.090)    
-0.089** 
(0.039) 
        
Inflation 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
 0.007*** 
(0.002)    
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
 0.007    
(0.004)    
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
        
Growth rate of 
housing price 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
 0.083*   
(0.045)    
0.015* 
(0.009) 
 0.056    
(0.034)    
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
        
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
-0.392*** 
(0.063) 
 -0.686    
(0.549)    
0.101 
(0.065) 
 -1.611*** 
(0.349)    
-0.265*** 
(0.050) 
        
Deposit reserve 
rate 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.001)    
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
 0.002    
(0.007)    
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
        
Observations 980  131   849  305 675 
R-squared 0.37  0.38   0.39  0.10 0.30 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B7  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: With More Indicators in the 
Promotion Index 
Variables Whole sample 
 By type  By period 
 National bank   Local bank  2005-2007   2008-2012 
        
Promotion -0.035*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.015    
(0.034)    
-0.060*** 
(0.015)    
 -0.055    
(0.054)    
-0.048*** 
(0.018)    
        
Banking sector 
concentration 
---- 
 
  ----               
                
---- 
 
 ----              
                
 ----               
                
        
Bank size 0.005 
(0.025) 
 -0.489*** 
(0.164)    
0.043    
(0.102)    
 0.133**  
(0.063)    
0.047    
(0.031)    
        
State-ownership 0.347** 
(0.155) 
 -0.074    
(0.575)    
0.157    
(0.209)    
 0.443    
(0.472)    
0.215    
(0.187)    
        
State-legal-person 
ownership 
0.269* 
(0.141) 
 0.615**  
(0.284)    
0.339*   
(0.200)    
 -0.011    
(0.497)    
0.336**  
(0.170)    
        
Capital to asset 
ratio 
0.014 
(0.011) 
 -0.056*** 
(0.020)    
0.039*** 
(0.012)    
 0.019    
(0.045)    
0.026**  
(0.013)    
        
GDP growth rate -0.982 
(1.271) 
 -29.513*** 
(11.028)    
-4.863*** 
(1.447)    
 7.782**  
(3.357)    
-2.808*   
(1.488)    
        
Inflation -0.040*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.216*** 
(0.042)    
-0.003    
(0.015)    
 0.003    
(0.103)    
-0.018    
(0.014)    
        
Growth rate of 
housing price 
-0.122 
(0.319) 
 -4.791*** 
(1.149)    
0.158    
(0.331)    
 -1.411    
(0.976)    
1.061**  
(0.413)    
        
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
1.777 
(1.242) 
 35.085**  
(14.239)    
2.474*   
(1.381)    
 -8.747    
(8.528)    
0.636    
(1.533)    
        
Deposit reserve 
rate 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
 0.202*** 
(0.030)    
0.004    
(0.016)    
 0.069    
(0.193)    
0.098*** 
(0.023)    
        
Observations 980  131 849  305 675 
R-squared 0.07  0.15 0.07  0.19 0.17 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B8   The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: With Dummy Variables to Present 
Each Value of Promotion Index 
Variables Whole sample 
 By type  By period 
 National bank   Local bank  2005-2007   2008-2012 
        
Promotion 
_dummy_1 
-0.061    
(0.079)   
 0.056    
(0.350)   
-0.013    
(0.082) 
 -0.047    
(0.186)   
-0.027    
(0.096)   
        
Promotion 
_dummy_2 
-0.138*   
(0.082)   
 -0.045    
(0.369)   
-0.160*   
(0.086) 
 -0.047    
(0.254) 
-0.185*   
(0.103)    
Promotion 
_dummy_3 
-0.151*   
(0.089)   
 0.061    
(0.374)   
-0.251*** 
(0.095)   
 -0.411    
(0.282) 
-0.206*   
(0.113)    
        
Banking sector 
concentration 
----  ---- ----  ---- ---- 
        
Bank size 0.018    
(0.024)   
 -0.345**  
(0.138)   
0.088    
(0.088)    
 -1.181*** 
(0.423)   
0.049    
(0.115)   
        
State-ownership 0.287**  
(0.142)    
 0.049    
(0.580)    
0.127    
(0.191)   
 0.032    
(0.540) 
0.018    
(0.273)   
        
State-legal-person 
ownership 
0.196    
(0.130)   
 0.572*   
(0.312)    
0.251    
(0.186)   
 -0.774    
(0.739)    
0.058    
(0.255)    
        
Capital to asset ratio 0.013    
(0.010) 
 -0.051**  
(0.022) 
0.030**  
(0.012)   
 0.061    
(0.042)    
0.030**  
(0.013)   
        
GDP growth rate -1.657    
(1.222) 
 -11.446**  
(5.622)    
-5.117*** 
(1.395)    
 -10.703**  
(4.717)   
-2.769*   
(1.643)    
        
Inflation -0.033*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.258*** 
(0.048) 
0.006    
(0.014)    
 0.013    
(0.057)    
-0.009    
(0.016)    
        
Growth rate of 
housing price 
-0.181    
(0.300) 
 -3.519*** 
(1.018)   
0.159    
(0.314)    
 -0.248    
(0.708) 
0.820**  
(0.399)   
        
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
1.973*   
(1.175)   
 22.164*   
(13.135) 
2.508*   
(1.334)    
 7.550    
(7.922) 
0.111    
(1.603) 
        
Deposit reserve rate 0.046*** 
(0.008) 
 0.161*** 
(0.025)    
0.012    
(0.015)    
 0.200    
(0.139)   
0.069*** 
(0.025) 
        
Observations 980  131 849  305 675 
R-squared 0.10  0.20 0.09  0.16 0.16 
Note: Here we present the case with only GDP indictor which is the most important indicator for political 
promotion to construct promotion index. Thus promotion index vary between [0,3] and three dummy variables are 
introduced in this case: Pomotion_dummy_i=1 represents promotion index=i where i=1,2,3. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.10 level. 
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Table B9  The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: With the Share of Local 
Government’s Spending in Total Government Spending as IV 
Variables Whole sample 
 By type  By period 
 National bank   Local bank  2005-2007   2008-2012 
        
Promotion  -0.104** 
(0.044) 
 0.565 
(2.514) 
-0.073* 
(0.044) 
 -0.094    
(0.127)    
-0.101* 
(0.052) 
        
Banking sector 
concentration 
    ---- 
 
 ---- 
 
   ---- 
 
     ----                
                 
  ---- 
 
        
Bank size 0.012 
 (0.025) 
 -0.293 
(0.421) 
0.133 
(0.090) 
 0.131**  
(0.064)    
0.066** 
(0.029) 
        
State-ownership  0.321** 
 (0.147) 
 0.151 
(0.701) 
0.060 
(0.195) 
 0.497    
(0.512)    
0.167 
(0.179) 
        
State-legal-person 
ownership 
 0.221* 
 (0.134) 
 0.609 
(0.386) 
0.274 
(0.190) 
 0.016    
(0.531)    
0.212 
(0.161) 
        
Capital to asset 
ratio 
 0.019* 
 (0.010) 
 -0.039 
(0.043) 
 0.039*** 
(0.011) 
 0.020    
(0.046)    
0.023** 
(0.012) 
        
GDP growth rate  -2.795** 
 (1.402) 
 -10.364 
(7.623) 
 -5.147*** 
(1.568) 
 6.927*   
(3.966)    
-3.031* 
(1.664) 
        
Inflation  -0.025* 
 (0.013) 
 -0.225*** 
(0.077) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
 0.026    
(0.118)    
-0.014 
(0.015) 
        
Growth rate of 
housing price 
 -0.098 
 (0.306) 
 -2.897 
(2.706) 
0.144 
(0.321) 
 -1.340    
(1.003)    
0.863** 
(0.377) 
        
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
0.153 
 (1.339) 
 18.659 
(12.046) 
1.806 
(1.396) 
 -10.591    
(10.212)    
-1.752 
(1.585) 
        
Deposit reserve 
rate 
   0.043*** 
 (0.008) 
 0.152** 
(0.067) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
 0.107    
(0.210)    
 0.074*** 
(0.014) 
        
Observations 980  131 849  305 675 
R-squared 0.10  0.14 0.10  0.17 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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Table B10   The Impact of Promotion on Bank Risk: With the Share of Local 
Government’s Revenue in Total Government Revenue as IV 
Variables Whole sample 
 By type  By period 
 National bank   Local bank  2005-2007   2008-2012 
        
Promotion  -0.134*** 
(0.051) 
 0.799 
(1.016) 
 -0.076* 
 (0.039) 
 -0.117 
(0.132) 
-0.111* 
(0.057) 
        
Banking sector 
concentration 
    ---- 
 
 ---- 
 
   ---- 
 
 ---- 
 
   ---- 
 
        
Bank size 0.007 
 (0.025) 
 -0.256 
(0.215) 
0.132 
 (0.090) 
 0.130** 
(0.064) 
 0.065** 
(0.029) 
        
State-ownership  0.339** 
 (0.148) 
 0.186 
(0.649) 
0.061 
 (0.195) 
 0.536 
(0.518) 
0.172 
(0.179) 
        
State-legal-person 
ownership 
 0.230* 
 (0.135) 
 0.632* 
(0.330) 
0.274 
 (0.190) 
 0.056 
(0.536) 
0.216 
(0.162) 
        
Capital to asset 
ratio 
 0.019* 
 (0.010) 
 -0.036 
(0.027) 
   0.039*** 
 (0.011) 
 0.020 
(0.046) 
 0.023** 
(0.012) 
        
GDP growth rate   -3.323** 
 (1.475) 
 -9.894 
(6.411) 
   -5.213*** 
 (1.521) 
 6.523 
(4.032) 
 -3.224* 
(1.728) 
        
Inflation  -0.023* 
 (0.013) 
 -0.219*** 
(0.051) 
0.011 
 (0.014) 
 0.037 
(0.120) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
        
Growth rate of 
housing price 
-0.088 
(0.308) 
 -2.662* 
(1.449) 
0.147 
 (0.321) 
 -1.304 
(1.009) 
 0.881** 
(0.379) 
        
Fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratio 
-0.265 
(1.390) 
 18.846 
(12.653) 
1.782 
 (1.389) 
 -11.714 
(10.403) 
-1.910 
(1.631) 
        
Deposit reserve 
rate 
 0.043*** 
(0.008) 
 0.146*** 
(0.035) 
0.002 
 (0.015) 
 0.122 
(0.212) 
 0.073*** 
(0.014) 
        
Observations 980  131    849  305 675 
R-squared 0.10  0.16    0.10  0.17 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 
0.10 level 
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